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In the past half of a century the American labor movement has 
emerged as one of the powerful forces dominating American life. From 
a position little more than peripheral in 1933, when its three million 
members were largely confined to skilled trades in relatively isolated 
or protected parts of the economy, the organized labor movement has 
expanded until collective bargaining has become a recognized and well 
established procedure in virtually every industry (Seidman, London, 
Karsh, & Tagliacazzo, 1958}. Collective bargaining relates to outcomes 
which concern the worker's individual relationship to the organization, 
such as hours and conditions of work, rates of pay, seniority, promo-
tions, etc. (Sayles & Strauss, 1967). 
Scattered efforts to form trade unions were made early in the 
nineteenth century, and by the close of the century the American Feder-
ation of Labor was well established in a number of skilled crafts. Yet 
until the 1930's union-management relations outside these crafts were 
highly unstable. Though unskilled workers sometimes joined unions 
in times of prosperity, they abandoned them when hard times returned. 
This pattern began to change drastically during the Great Depression 
of the 1930's when relatively large permanent trade union membership 
emerged not only in the traditional crafts where workers had found it 
easier to organize, but also in mass production industry (Strauss & 
Sayles, 1972). 
The fundamental change in our basic labor law, established by the 
passage of the National Labor Relations or Wagner Act in 1935, laid 
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the legal foundation for the organizations of millions of workers in the 
mass production and other less-skilled industries; and the organizing 
drives first of the CIO and then of the AFL, taking advantage of this 
opportunity provided the impetus for the mass movement into unionism 
(Seidman, London, Karsh, & Tagliacazzo, 1958). The full employment of 
the war and postwar periods, combined with the rising level of prices 
and the ample profits earned by employers, provided an economic environ-
ment favorable to the growth of nnionism (Seidman, London, Karsh, & 
Tagliacazzo, 1958; Strauss & Sayles, 1972). 
After World \var II, nnion growth began to slow down. Membership 
reached its peak in the mid-1950's and then began to decline. The pro-
portion of workers in easy-to-organize industries began to decline. 
From 1953 to the early 1960's the economy slowed down ~tile technologi-
cal change occurred at a rapid rate (Strauss & Sayles, 1972). Manufac-
turing employment as a whole fell off, and the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947 and Landrum Griffin Act in 1959 presented further 
barriers to union growth by restricting the use of the secondary boy-
cott. 
Since 1965, union membership has begun to increase again, at least 
in absolute numbers (Strauss & Sayles, 1972). Currently, of the entire 
U.S. \'larking population, approximately one-fourth is unionized. Some 
members are attracted to or committed to their union and identify with 
it more than others, but there is no doubt that for a substantial part 
of the working population, union membership plays an important role in 
its working life {Chamberlain & Cullen, 1971; Rosen, 1975; Strauss, 
1963). It most certainly affects the outcomes which accrue from work-
ing, and it may very well affect people's perceptions of and attitudes 
towards work and actual work behavior (Hammer, 1978). 
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In recent years there has been a renewed interest among researchers 
in employees' attitudes toward unions (Hammer, 1978; Hamner & Smith, 
1978; Herman, 1973; Smith, 1977), their decisions to join unions (Get-
man, Goldberg & Herman, 1976; Strauss & Sayles, 1972), and their sup-
port of union militant activities (Alutto & Belasco, 1974; Rosen, 1975). 
The effects of union membership, however, have not received much atten-
tion since the "dual loyaltyn research of the 1950 1 s, which tested the 
hypothesis that positive attitudes toward the union would lead to nega-
tive attitudes toward the employer (Dean, 1954; Kerr, 1954; Purcell, 
1954; Stagner, 1954}. From both earlier research and recent work, we 
know of reasons why people join unions, but we have very little infor-
mation on the impact of union membership on employee motivation, per-
formance and attitudes (Hammer, 1978). 
In the field of organizational behavior, theories and research on 
worker performance and attitudes have largely ignored the role of the 
union as a potential contributor to indices of organizational effective-
ness (Hammer, 1978). Theories of worker motivation and attitude forma-
tion focus on the interaction between an individual 1 s need structure and 
the employing organization 1 s formal and informal reward systems, organi-
zational structure and job designs (Friedlander, 1964; Hackman & Lawler, 
1971; Herman, Dunhan & Hulin, 1975; I~, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosen-
thal, 1964; Lawler, 1973; Lawler & Hall, 1970; Porter and Lawler, 1965}. 
Performance, tardiness, absenteeism and turnover are explained in terms 
of behavior-outcome contingencies set up by the employer through per-
personnel policies, supervision, technology and hierarchial structure, 
and by co-workers through their sanctioning of specific actions (Ham-
mer, 1978). It is the purpose of this paper to argue for expanding re-
search of the impact of unions on worker perceptions and attitudes and 
to describe the effects of union membership on worker's reactions to 
their conditions of employment. 
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For American labor, union memberShip has come to mean pay increase~ 
better working conditions, job security and protection (Chamberlain & 
Cullen, 1971; Rees, 1962}. Workersr intentions to join in collective 
action vis-a-vis an employer are based heavily on people's expectations 
~Lat unions will improve their ability to obtain valued outcomes (Ham-
mer, 1978). While there are universal expectations of greater outcome 
attainment within organized labor, the ability of unions to achieve 
worker goals tlurough the collective bargaining process varies widely 
across industries (Kochan & Block, 1977) and over time (Rees, 1962). If 
Darwin's laws are applicable to unions as they are to biological organ-
isms; one would expect that the stronger the union, the more it can ob-
tain for its members (which is the reason for its existence} and the 
more members' attitudes and behaviors might be influenced by it (Hammer, 
1978}. 
The present study proposes to examine relationShips between local 
union characteristics and workers' perceptions of outcomes, attitudes 
about their job and job satisfaction. Members of local unions of retail 
store workers, working in the same industry will be tlLe subjects in-
volved. Until recently, little study has been attempted with regard 
to tlLe local union, the basic structural unit in which the membership is 
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found (Sayles & Strauss, 1967). Yet, this is the only union world that 
the rank and file member knows. The local unions in the present study 
will vary in strength (bargai~ing power) and the hypotheses to be tested 
will use union strength as the independent variable. Before the argu-
ments supporting union strength-employee reactions (perceptions, atti-
tudes and job satisfaction) are presented the operational definitions 
of the union strength variable will be discussed. 
Vnion Strength 
Union strength has been defined as those activities and organiza-
tional attributes which allow the union to achieve its goals (Kochan & 
Wheeler, 1975). Sources of union strength are usually identified as the 
strike, the slowdown, the use of union labels to control product markets, 
control over the labor supply through limited access to membership sta-
tus, and the use of closed shops (Rees, 1962). The traditional opera-
tional definition of this concept among labor economists has been the 
percentage of workers in an industry who are unionized or covered under 
collective bargaining agree~ents (Lewis, 1963). This union density in-
dex is not without its problems, because it assumes that there is a lin-
ear relationship between the percent of an industry•s labor market con-
tained in the local union and the ability of that union to attain valued 
outcomes for its members (Kochan & Wheeler, 1975). This relationship 
has not been found to be linear, as union density seems to be affected 
by the educational level of the work force and the geographical concen-
tration of a given industry (Rosen, 1969). Block and Kuskin (1978) found 
\ 
that nonunion sector wages are generally more responsive to individual 
worker levels of education and experience and regional price ana level 
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variation. Baskin (1977) found that relative wages of union and non-
union workers varies by race, sex, location and occupation. Further-
more, union power l~as been found to increase with greater organizational 
strength (Rosen, 1969). Within a given industry there are wide varia-
tions in the range of outcomes (such as wages, fringe benefits, senior-
ity clauses, working conditions} achieved by different local unions 
(Hammer, 1978). Therefore, percent organized is a contaminated measure 
of union strength. 
It has been suggested, based on research data, that the relative 
wage attab1ed through collective bargaining is a more valid indicator 
of the union characteristic than is percent organized (Kochan & Block, 
1977; Levinson, 1966). The use of wage levels as an outcome assigns a 
fixed numerical value to the union strength variable. According to 
Chamberlain (1951), union strength should not be quantified in this man-
ner because it varies with the bargaining issue and the existing eco-
nomic, social and political conditions. Furthermore, unions appear to 
increase wages more when first organized than later on (Rosen, 1969). 
Thus a union may have more power over wage levels than other fringe 
benefits or job security at a particular time, but this configuration 
may change as the conditions surrormding the bargaining change {Hanuner, 
1978). 
When the purpose of study is to ascertain determinants of worker 
attitudes, bargaining outcomes can serve as a measure of ~e effec-
tiveness of the collective bargaining process in achieving favorable 
terms and conditions of employment for workers (Kochan & Block, 1977). 
Wages, fringe benefits and working conditions are ou·tcomes of unioni-
zation, a result in many cases of the use of power sources as well as 
the collective bargaining process. Outcomes are experienced directly 
by union members, and it is the experience of the membership and not 
the percent of \vorkers who are organized which should affect people • s 
perceptions, attitudes and behaviors. It is, therefore, more appro-
priate theoretically to use outcomes of w1ion membership as the oper-
ational definition of union strength (independffi1t variable} when one 
examines the effects of unions on the individual worker because an out-
come is closer to the dependent variables (attitudes, perceptions, job 
satisfaction) in a causal chain than is a factor like percent organized 
(Hammer, 1978). 
In the present study, a Contract Scale Index will be employed in 
measuring union strength, which transforms bargaining outcomes to dollar 
values (Kochan & Hh.eeler, 1975) . When examining the potential influ-
ence of the union on employee attitudes and behaviors, it becomes clear 
that one can not construct a network of hypotheses without knowing the 
union in question. Collective bargaining agreements differ from one 
international union to another, as well as from one local to another 
local within one international. The union contract is a primary source 
of information for examinu1g the effects of union characteristics when 
the individual is the unit of analysis. 
Union Strength-Employee Perceptions, Attitudes and Job Satisfaction 
Hypotheses 
As mentioned earlier, the right to unionize has come to mean pay 
increases, better working conditions, job security and protection from 
management (Chamberlain & Cullen, 1972; Rees, 1962) • The stronger the 
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union is the more able it should be to deliver these conditions to its 
members (Seidman et al., 1958). Cognitive dissonance theory suggests 
that outcomes which are acquired through the investment of personal ef-
fort and costs (as in the case of the history of collective bargaining) 
are highly valued (Aronson & Mills, 1959; Festinger, 1957). To union 
members, collective bargaining outcomes are the results of such invest-
ments, and the greater the union gains the more these gains should be 
valued or desired (Hammer, 1978). Local union strength, as measured by 
the relative hourly wage obtained through collective bargaining, has 
been found to be related to the desirability of job outcomes which are 
under total or partial control of the union, such as job security, pay 
and the wish for respectful treatment from superiors (Hammer, 1978). 
From this line of reasoning the following hypothesis was derived: 
Hypothesis 1 - As union strength increases, outcomes under 
union control (such as pay and job security) will be per-
ceived ry union members as more desirable than factors not under 
union control (such as creativity}. 
Job s3tisfaction can be defined as an affective response of the 
worker to his job and can be viewed as a result of consequence of the 
worker's experience on the job in relation to his own values, that is, 
what he wants cr expects from it (Smith, Hulin, & Kendall, 1969). Since 
job satisfaction is a partial result of the extent to which people re-
ceive valued outcomes and events from their job (Locke, 1976)/ it can 
be postulated that union strength will be related to an individual's 
satisfaction with those aspects of his job covered under the collective 
bargaining agreement. Kochan et al. (1975) found in their study of 
9 
local union leaders and stewards that collective bargaining is seen as 
most beneficial for the attainment of outcomes judged most important to 
workers, such as wages and fringe benefits, job security, working condi-
tions and fair treatment through the grievance procedure. Hammer (1978) 
found a positive relationship between ~ion strength (using relative 
wage) and pay satisfaction. It is therefore postulated. that: 
Hypothesis 2 - As union strength increases, union members 
will be more satisfied with those aspects of their job which 
are under partial control of the union (such as pay) than these 
j?b factors not under union control (such as creativity). 
The next step in the present study was to examine members' percep-
tions of chances for outcome attairrment. In a study of white collar 
workers, employees were asked about their desire for promotion 1 their 
perceptio~ of chances of promotion, and their satisfaction with the job 
(Stagner & Rosen,l969). All of the employees reported a strong desire 
for promotion, and those who thought their chances were good scored high 
in jot satisfaction. Those who saw little chance of promotion, however, 
't~ere dissatisfied - and in same cases, they expressed aggressive atti-
t~des toward the employer (Stagner & Rosen, 1969). As was 9reviously 
~entioned, collective bargaining is seen as beneficial for the attain-
ment of outcomes judged most important to \vorkers: wages ru"'ld fringe 
benefits, job security, working conditions and fair treatment through 
the grievance prccedure (Kochan Sc t~heeler, 1975) . It is therefore 
,postulated that: 
Hypothesis 3 - As union 3trength increases~ ~ember's 
perceived opportur..ity of outcome attainment will be greater 
for those job factors under union control (such as pay} 
than for those job factors not under union control (such 
as creativity). 
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In sum, the present study focused on the possible impact which 
local union strength or power can have on rnernbers 1 wants and needs in 
their job, their beliefs in the probability of attaining what they want, 




The subjects in the study were 248 full-time members of the Retail 
Employees Union~ All the members were employed in the supermarket in-
dustry located in the northeastern part of the country. The mean edu-
cational level for the groups was 12.1 years of academic schooling • 
.He an age per group was 3 2. 3 years. The mean number of union membership 
years for the groups ranged from 6-10 years.. The subjects were ran-
domly selected within the three groups of union strength. 
Procedure 
Data were collected through the use of local union bargaining con-
tracts, interviews with union officials and questionnaires distributed 
to the members. 
All attitudinal and perceptual variables were assessed through 
questionnaires sent to the union members. These were completed and re-
turned to the researcher in a self-addressed, pre-stamped envelope. 
The cover page of tl~e questionnaire identified it as a tnesis research 
project and the respondents were asked some background questions, such 
as: age, sex, educational level and local union membership years. The 
subjects were informed of the study through separate letters from the 
president of each local union. Information about confidential treatment 
of responses was provided to all participants. 
The 248 members wh.o returned data comprise 35 percent of the sub-
jects scheduled for inclusion in the study. The response rate across 
tne locals ranged from 29 percent to 38 percent. 
Measures 
Union strength was measured by the Contract Scale Index (Kochan & 
vfueeler, 1975}. The contracts used were those which the local unions 
reached at the last collective bargaining settlement with the organi-
zation. 
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In the development of the Contract Scale Index, outcomes were 
scored according to the degree they approached attainment of union bar-
gaining goals. As a result of the scaling of bargaining outcomes this 
way, it becomes possible to interpret this analysis as a study of the 
determinants of union bargaining effectiveness. The coding scheme that 
was devised for assigning scores to particular outcomes is sho~m in 
Appendix A. 
A total score was calculated for each contract by simply adding the 
scores (assigned to each of the contract categories as listed in Appen-
dix A) of those clauses contained in the particular contract. This 
total unweighted score forms the measure of bargaining outcomes which 
is the operational definition of union strength used in the present 
study. Kochan and Wheeler (1975) have found that weighted measures 
proved to be of no greater predictive value than simple unweighted mea-
sures. The two measures were correlated very highly (r=.936). This 
Contract Scale Index makes it possible to compare local unions which 
might differ in the kinds and amounts of bargaining outcomes attain~d 
along one dimension. 
The members• feelings about work outcomes were assessed by asking 
each subject in the questionnaire to rate, on a five-point, verbally 
anclwred scale, the desirability of a set of possible outcomes, some 
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under union control and others unrelated to union jurisdiction. Percep-
tions of chances for outcome attainment were measured by having the sub-
jects rate their chances of getting each of these outcomes, again on a 
five-point scale where response alternatives will range from "no 
chance" to "very good chance". The questionnaire is shown in Appen-
dix B. 
Job satisfaction was measured by the Minnesota Satisfaction Ques-
tionnaire (MSQl (Weiss, Dawis, England, & Loquist, 1967) . Twelve scales 
of the long form MSQ were chosen for the study, some of these job fac-
tors were under union control, otners were unrelated to union jurisdic-
tion. These scales included: Achievement, Advancement, Company Poli-
cies and Practices, Compensation, Creativity, Recognition, Supervision-
Human Relations, Supervision-Technical, Working Conditions, Security, 
Responsibility and Authority. Each item in the MSQ refers to a rein-
forcer in the work environment. The respondent indicates how satisfied 
he/she is with the reinforcer on the present job. Five response alter-
natives are presented for each item: "Very Dissatisfied; Dissatisfied; 
Neither Dissatisfied nor Satisfied;. Satisfied; Very Satisfiedn. 
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Results 
Scores on the Contract Scale Index were calculated for each local 
union and these total score values were rank ordered to form the high, 
medium and low groups of union strength. For each subject within these 
three groups, scores on the MSQ and employee attitude survey were cal-
culated. These data were analyzed by an Analysis of Variance with Re-
peated Measures (ANOVR). This procedure performs an analysis of vari-
ance on the one between subjects factor of union strength. and one within 
subjects factor (repeated measures) of members 1 reactions. 
Table 1 gives the means and standard deviations for each of the 
three groups 1 desirability of job-related outcomes. Table 2 presents 
the results of the 3x6 ru~OVR testing hypothesis 1. The effect of union 
strength. was not found to be significant, F (2,245) = .45, p. "7 .05. The 
effect of job factors was found to be significant, ~ (5,1225) = 94.79, 
p. < .01. Also, the interaction effect of union strength by job factors 
was found to be significant, E:_ (10,1225) = 1.99, p. <. .05. No apparent 
difference between the means of the Low (3.62} Medium (3.60} and High 
(3.51) Union Strength groups were found. Although the union strength 
by job factors interaction was significant, post-hoc comparisons 
(Scheffe) showed no significant differences between levels of union 
strength and any particular job factor. 
In order to further analyze the data pertaining to the differences 
between members' ratings of desirability of outcomes with those job 
factors under union control versus those job factors not under union 
jurisdiction it was necessary to carry out a post-hoc comparison. The 
Scheffe !vlultiple Comparison Method was applied to compare the means of 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Union Members Desirability of 
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the three job factors under union control (Advancement, Pay, Job Secu-
rity) against those factors not under union jurisdiction (Creativity) , 
Recognition, Achievement) for any differences. As predicted, the fac-
tors under union control were significantly greater, p ( .01 than those 
factors not under union jurisdiction. 
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Tables 3 and 4 give the means and standard deviations for each of 
the three groups' job satisfaction measures. Table 5 presents the re-
sults of the 3x8 ANOVR for testing hypoULesis 2. The effect of union 
strength was not found to be significant,~ (2,245} = .99, p.~.05. The 
effect of job factors was found to be significant,~ (7,1715} = 106.84, 
p < .01. Also, the interaction effect of union strength by job factors 
was found to be significant, ~ (14,1715} = 3.99, p.<.ol. No apparent 
differences between the means of the Low (16.86), Medium (16.91) and 
High (16.25) groups were found. Although the union strength by job fac-
tors interaction was significant, post-hoc comparisons resulted in no 
significant differences to be found between the levels of union strength 
(low, medium, high) and any particular job factor. 
In order to further analyze the data pertaining to the differences 
between members' ratings of job satisfaction with those job factors un-
der union control versus those job factors not under union jurisdiction, 
it was necessary to carry out a post-hoc comparison. The Scheff~Multi­
ple Comparison Method was applied in the comparison of the means of the 
four job factors under union control (Job Security, Pay, Working Condi-
tions, Advancement) against those factors not under union jurisdiction 
(Creativity, Responsibility, Recognition, Achievement). As predicted, 
the factors under union control were significantly greater, £.<.01 than 
18 
Table 3 
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those factors not under union jurisdiction. There was no significant 
difference found between those factors under union control and the non-
union job factor of responsibility. 
Table 6 presents the results of the 3x8 ANOVR for further testing 
hypothesis 2. The effect of union strength was again found not to be 
significant, F (2,245) = 1.30, p~ .OS. The effect of Job Factors was 
found to be significant, F (7,1715) = 129.87, ~<.01. The interaction 
effect of union strength by job factors was found to be significant, 
F (14,1715) = 4.04, ~<.01. Again, no apparent differences between the 
means of the Low (16.21), Medium (16.17) and High (15.46) groups was 
found. Post-hoc comparisons of the interaction revealed no significant 
differences between the levels of union strength (low, medium, high) and 
any particular job factor. 
In order to further analyze the data pertaining to the differences 
between members• ratings of job satisfaction with those job factors un-
der union control versus those job factors not under union jurisdiction 
it was necessary to carry out a post-hoc comparison. The Scheff/Multi-
ple Comparison Method was applied comparing the means of the four job 
factors under union control (Job Security, Pay, Working Conditions, Ad-
vancement} against those factors not under union jurisdiction (Authorit~ 
Company Policies, Supervision-Human Relations, Supervision-Technical). 
As predicted, those factors under union control were significantly 
greater,£< .01 than those factors not under union control. 
Table 7 gives the means and standard deviations for each of the 
three groups perceived probability of outcome attainment. Table 8 rep-
resents the results of the 3x6 ANOVR for testing hypothesis 3. The 
Table 6 







!Union Strength x 
lrob Factors 
Error 
* p <. 05 







df MS F - - -
2 109.34 1.30 
245 84.07 
7 1661.97 129.87** 




Means and Standard Deviations of Union Members Perceived Probability 




























s ec c re 
3.71 2.96 
.85 1.73 
4.17 2. 92 




c Ah c 
-
3.09 3.64 X 
1.36 1.23 S.D. 
-
2.80 3.83 X 
1.44 1.29 S.D. 
-
2.56 3.37 X 





Analysis of Variance wi~ Repeated Measures of Union Members Perceived 






Onion Strength x 
Job Factors 
Error 
* E.< .OS 
** E_<: .01 
Outcome Attainment 












effect of union strength was not found to be significant, F (2,245] = 
1.83, ~>.OS. The effect of job factors was found to be significant, 
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! (5,1225} = 90.12, ~ ~.01. Also, the interaction effect of union 
strengtlL by job factors was found to be significant F (10,1225} = 2.72, 
~(.01. No apparent differences between the means of the Low (3.27}, 
Medium (3.34} and High {3.11} groups were found. Post-hoc comparisons 
of the interaction revealed no significant differences between the lev-
els of union strength (low, medium, high) and any particular job factor. 
The Scheffe/~Iultiple Comparison Method was used to analyze the dif-
ferences between members 1 ratings of perceived probability of outcome 
attainment with those factors under union control (Advancement, Pay, Job 
Security) versus those factors not under union jurisdiction (Creativity, 
Recognition, Achievement} • As predicted, ~~ose factors under union con-
trol were significantly greater,~< .01, than those factors not under 
union jurisdiction. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
The present study examined the effects of a major union character-
istic, union strength, and union members• ratings of desirability of 
job-related outcomes, outcome attainment and job satisfaction. In gen-
eral, the following conclusions can be drawn from the results of this 
study: 
(1) The hypothesis of a positive and significant relation-
ship between union strength and desirability of outcomes 
under union control was partially supported. 
{2) The hypothesis of a positive and significant relation-
ship between union strength and job satisfaction with 
those aspects of mernber 1 s job under union control was 
partially supported. 
{3) The hypothesis of a positive and significant relation-
ship between union strength and outcome attainment of 
factors under union control was partially supported. 
The results of a nonsignificant effect between levels of union 
strength in all three of the major hypotheses must be viewed in light of 
several limitations. First, L~ sample was composed of only three local 
unions, which forced a rank ordering (according to the Contract Scale 
Index scores) into the high, medium and low groups of union strength. 
Secondly, union strength was a factor of importance in this particular 
study because the employer could bargain separately witlL each local 
union. Where bargaining has industry wide guidelines, as was found with 
the retail store union workers, variations in outcome attainment from 
collective bargaining between the local unions were not great enough for 
this factor (union strength} to have much impact. Due to this situa-
tion, differences between local union strength groups were not found and 
the interaction between levels of union strength with any particular job 
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factor were not found. 
The finding of a significant effect between the desirability of 
outcomes under union control (Pay, Job Security, Advancement) against 
those factors not under union control (Creativity, Recognition, Achieve-
ment) suggests that union members generally find job outcomes under 
union control more desirable than those outcomes not under union juris-
diction. This result is consistent with Hammer's (1978) study, which 
found pay and job security more desirable with members than outcomes not 
under union jurisdiction. 
The finding of a significant effect between job satisfaction with 
those aspects of the job under union control, versus those aspects of 
the job not under union jurisdiction was generally supported. Satisfac-
tion scores on the union controlled job factors of Pay, Advancement, 
Working Conditions, and Job Security were significantly greater than 
satisfaction scores on Creativity, Authority, Supervision-Technical, 
Supervision-numan Relations, Recognition, Achievement and Company Poli-
cies (non-union factors). Responsibility was the only non-union job 
factor where no significant differences were found with union controlled 
job factors. These findings were consistent with several other investi-
gations: Kochan and Wheeler (1975) found a significant effect between 
collective bargaining and wages and fringe benefits, job security, work-
ing conditions and fair treatment through the grievance procedure; 
Hammer (1978) found a positive relationship between union strength and 
pay satisfaction. 
The finding of a significant effect between perceived probability 
of outcome attainment with those job factors u~der union control against 
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those factors not under union jurisdiction suggests that union member's 
generally perceive a fairly good chance of obtaining outcomes under 
union control (Pay, Advancement, Job Security); These results were con-
sistent with the findings of Hammer (1978) and Kochan and Wheeler (1975) 
who found collective bargaining beneficial to the attainment of factors 
under union jurisdiction (wages, benefits, job security, working condi-
tions). 
The results of this study suggested that characteristics of impor-
tant work related organizations, such as unions, might have an impact on 
workers' reactions to events in their work world. This was borne out by 
the fact that the workers in this study rated job factors under union 
control more desirable than job factors not under union jurisdiction. 
Job factors under union control were perceived by members as more likely 
to be obtained on the job, and members expressed higher levels of jcb 
satisfaction with job factors under union control than with those job 
factors not under union jurisdiction. Becuase the results were in the 
expected direction, it seems worthwhile to conduct further investiga-
tions of these relationships in the future. Perhaps using a larger num-
ber of local unions varying in bargaining outcomes would lead to a more 
thorough investigation. The overall conclusion of this study is that 
the union is an important contributor to employees' perceptions and at-




CONTRACT SCALE INDEX 
The coding scheme for the analysis of the contrasts is specified below. 
Each contract category was given a scale value according to the follow-
ing schemata: 
Cost of Living Allowance 
0 = no reference 
1 = some cost of living clause 
Education Increments 
0 = no reference 
1 = some provision 
Merit Increments 
0 = some provision 
1 = no provision 
Overtime Pay 
0 = no reference 
1 = straight time pay or straight compensatory time off 
2 = employee option for straight time cash or compensatory time 
3 = 1~ time pay (cash or compensatory time off) 
4 = 1~ time pay (cash or compensatory time off at employee's 
option) 
5 = double-time pay (cash or compensatory time off) 
6 = double-time pay (cash or compensatory time off at employee's 
option) 
Call Back Pay 
0 = no reference 
1 = some provision for minimum number of hours paid 
Shift Differentials 
0 = no reference 
1 = some provision 
Meal Allowance Mileage Allowance 
0 = no reference 0 = no reference 
1 = meal allowance 1 = some reference 
2 = meals supplied by employer 
off 
Length of Work Week 
0 = no reference 
1 = 72 hours or more 
2 = 64-71 hours 
3 = 56-63 hours 
4 = 48-55 hours 
5 = 40-47 hours 
Starting Salary 
0 = no reference 
1 = 4,500-5,400 
2 = 5,500-6,400 
3 = 6,500-7,400 
4 = 7,500-8,400 
5 = 8,500-9,400 
6 = 9,500-10,400 
7 = 10,500-11,400 
8 = 11,500-12,400 
9 = 12,500+ 
Longevity Pay 
0 = no provision 
1 = some provision 
Annual Increase in Wages 
(first year of contract) 
0 = no provision 
1 = 1 to 3 percent 
2 = 4 to 6 percent 
3 = more than 6 percent 
Sick Leave 
0 = no reference 
1 = some provision 
Unused Sick Leave 
0 = no provision 
1 =some provision, e.g., 
accumulation allowed, cash 
or compensatory time allowed 
Death in Family Leave 
0 = no reference 
1 = some prov~s~on, employee 
charged for sick leave 
2 = some provision, no 
charge to sick leave 
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Severance Pay 
0 = no reference 
1 = some reference 
Family Medical Plan 
0 = no reference 
1 = employee pays total 
premium 
2 = part paid by employer 
3 = total paid by employ-
er 
Education Costs Reimbursed 
0 = no reference 
1 = partial payment by 
employer 
2 = total payment by 
employer 
Life Insurance 
0 = no reference 
1 = part paid by employer 
2 = total paid by employ-
er 
Pensions 
0 = no reference 
1 = employer makes some 
contributes to a pen-
sion fund; employee 
contributes {contri-
butary plan) 
2 = noncontributary plan 
Vacations 
0 = no reference 
1 = number of days vaca-
tion increases with 
length of service 
2 = number of days vaca-
tion decreases with 
length of service 
Clothing Allowance 
0 ::::: no reference 
1 = cash allowance 
2 ::::: furnished 
Union Security 
0 = no reference 
1 = maintenanc~ of membership 
2 = agency shop 
3 = modified union shop 
4 = rmion shop 
Payrole Deduction of Dues 
0 = no reference 
1 = employer deducts dues; 
union charged fee 
2 = employer deducts dues; 
no charge to union 
Time Off for Union Business 
0 = no reference 
1 = time off for grievances 
of negotiations 
2 = time off for union 
seminars or conventions 
3 = time off for all union 
business 
4 = union has full-time 
paid staff representation 
Bulletin Boards 
0 = no provision 
1 = employer may edit or must 
approve material 
2 = employer supplies space 
for boards 
3 = employer furnishes boards 
Management Rights 
0 = some management rights 
clause in the contract 
l = no management rights 
clause in the contract 
Union Members Retain Prevailing 
Rights 
0 = no provision 
l = some provision 
Holidays 
0 = no reference 
1 = five days or less 
2 =.5~-7 days 
3 = 7~-9 days 
4 = 9~-11 days 
5 = 11~+ days 
Compensation for on-the-job 
Injury 
0 = no reference 
1 = state workmen 1 s 
compensation 
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2 = some prov1s1on in 
addition to workmen•s 
compensation 
Jury or Witness Pay 
0 = no reference 
1 = some provision 
Leave of Absence 
0 = no reference 
1 = some provision 
Vacancies-Promotions 
0 = no reference 
1 = decision of the store 
manager 
2 = decision of the dis-
trict manager 
3 = by procedures in the 
contract 
Safety and Health 
0 = no reference 
1 = some provision 
Shift Exchange 
0 = no reference 
1 = permission of manage-
ment required 
2 = modification of man-
agement required 




Rules and Regulations 
0 = prior established rules 
prevail 
1 = no provision 
2 = contract prevails over 
rules 
3 = contract prevails over 
prior rules and rules 
are subject to grievance 
procedure 
4 = rules must be mutually 
agreed to in bargaining 
Parking Lot 
0 = no reference 
1 = same provision 
Community Services Program 
0 = no reference 
1 = some provision 
Union Representation 
0 = no reference 
1 = representation rights 
other than exclusive 
2 = exclusive representation 
rights 
Type of Agreement 
0 = none 
1 :::::: agree to adopt to 
ordinance 
2 = memo of understanding 
3 = labor agreement 
Nondiscrimination 
0 = no reference 
1 = statement of policy 
2 = affirmative action 
32 
Grievance Procedure 
0 = no reference 
1 = final step rests 
in store manager 
2 = final step rests in 
district manager 
3 = final step is ad vi-
sory arbitration 
4 = final step is binding 
arbitration 
No-Strike Provision 
0 = a no-strLke clause 
is written in the 
contract 
1 = a no-strike clause 
is not written in 
the contract 
Impasse Procedure 
(for impasses that arise in 
future contract negotiations) 
0 = no reference 
1 = mediation 
2 = factfinding 
3 :::::: advisory arbitration 
4 :::::: binding arbitration 
Working out of Classification 
0 = no reference 
1 = acting rank pay pro-
vided 
Clean Up Time 
0 = no reference 
1 = some provision 
Savings Clause 
0 = no reference 
1 = some reference 
Appendix B 
EMPLOYEE ATTITUDE SURVEY 
HOW TO ANSWER: After reading each statement, circle the number that 
best describes how desirable the following job factors are to you. 
l. The chance for advancement on my job. 
2. The chance to try out some of my own ideas. 
3. The amount of pay I receive. 
4. The way my job provides for steady employment. 
5. The praise I get for doing a good job. 
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3 . 4 
HOW TO ANSWER: After reading each statement, circle the number that 
best describes your perceived chance of obtaining the following job 
factors. 
t:£1 0 
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1. The opportunity for advancement on my job. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. The opportunity to try my own methods of doing 
the job. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. The opportunity to earn adequate pay increases. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. My job provides for steady future employment. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. My job provides recognition for doing a good 
job. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. My work provides me with a sense of achievement. 1 2 3 4 5 
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